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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce a concept called “virtual co-embodiment”, which enables a user to share their virtual avatar with
another entity (e.g., another user, robot, or autonomous agent). We describe a proof-of-concept in which two users can be immersed
from a first-person perspective in a virtual environment and can have complementary levels of control (total, partial, or none) over a
shared avatar. In addition, we conducted an experiment to investigate the influence of users’ level of control over the shared avatar and
prior knowledge of their actions on the users’ sense of agency and motor actions. The results showed that participants are good at
estimating their real level of control but significantly overestimate their sense of agency when they can anticipate the motion of the
avatar. Moreover, participants performed similar body motions regardless of their real control over the avatar. The results also revealed
that the internal dimension of the locus of control, which is a personality trait, is negatively correlated with the user’s perceived level of
control. The combined results unfold a new range of applications in the fields of virtual-reality-based training and collaborative
teleoperation, where users would be able to share their virtual body.
Index Terms—Virtual Embodiment, Sense of Agency, Avatars, Virtual Reality, User Experimentation
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The emerging use of self-avatars in virtual reality (VR)
has uncovered numerous novel possibilities to explore the
relation between body and mind [1], [2]. Indeed, avatars in
VR enable original experiences as they can be altered and
controlled in numerous ways. For example, it is possible
to be embodied in avatars with a different gender [3] or
with morphological changes such as possessing a hand
with six fingers [2]. Such experiences have helped to better
understand how users perceive their virtual representation
in VR and to explore how users are willing to accept a
virtual body that differs from their own in terms of visual
aspect and control schemes. Furthermore, the need to collab-
orate in VR reinvigorates research interests in developing
new ways for users to collaboratively interact in a virtual
environment (VE), especially through their avatars [4], [5].
More specifically, several VR shared experiences, in which
two individuals can share a first-person view, have been
explored, especially in terms of gesture training or collab-
orative teleoperation [6], [7]. However, previous studies on
this topic did not involve scenarios in which several users
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could be embodied in the same avatar.
In this paper, we introduce a new concept, termed
“virtual co-embodiment.” While the concept of “co-
embodiment” has been recently defined outside of the scope
of VR [8], this is the first study to the best of the authors’
knowledge to define “virtual co-embodiment” as a situation
that enables a user and another entity (e.g., another user,
robot, or autonomous agent) to be embodied in the same
virtual avatar. Such a situation raises the question about
how sharing a virtual body influences ones’ perception and
actions in the VE. Potential applications of this new con-
cept range from VR-based motion training to collaborative
teleoperation, e.g., to efficiently transfer physical skills from
an expert to a novice, or to enable the simultaneous control
of a robot by two experts as if the robot was their actual
body. In such scenarios, it is therefore important to maintain
the feeling of control for both users so that they have the
impression that they are controlling the avatar in the same
manner that they would control their own bodies.
As a first step, this study focused on two users sharing
the same virtual body. In VR, the sense of embodiment
(SoE) is a theoretical framework widely used to evaluate
how users perceive and accept their avatar to be their own
representation in the virtual world [9], [10]. This framework
is often divided into three dimensions [1]: the sense of
agency (SoA), sense of self-location (SoSL), and sense of
body ownership (SoBO). However, owing to the particu-
larity of the virtual co-embodiment experience, in which
users share control over their virtual body, and the potential
implications that sharing this control would increase the
interaction capabilities of users in a VE, we decided to
focus our efforts on the assessment of the SoA. The abil-
ity to modulate the sharing of avatar control enables the
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Fig. 1. Our “Virtual Co-Embodiment” experience enables a pair of users to be embodied simultaneously in the same virtual avatar (Left). The
positions and orientations of the two users are applied to the virtual body of the avatar based on a weighted average, e.g., “User A” with 25% control
and “User B” with 75% control over the virtual body (Right).
possibility to assess the SoA when two users collaborate to
achieve a task while embodied in the same virtual avatar.
Previous research explored the influence of perceptual and
motor mismatches over the SoA. Such studies showed that
it is possible for users to feel agency toward actions they
did not perform [11], and highlighted interesting insights
regarding the SoA with its possible modulations, inspiring
the following question: To which level can users experience
a SoA over a shared virtual avatar?
To answer this question, we conducted a VR experiment
in which 12 pairs of individuals participated. Each pair was
embodied in the same shared avatar from a first-person
perspective (1PP) and was asked to perform different tasks
in the VE while sharing the avatar control. The control
was shared by averaging the position and orientation of
the hands of both users according to a predefined level of
control for each user (from no-control to full-control) and by
animating the avatar accordingly. Our two main hypotheses
were as follows: (1) the SoA would be positively correlated
with the degree of control over the shared avatar; and (2) the
SoA would be positively influenced by how much the task is
potentially restricting the participant’s choices.Overall, our
results support our main hypotheses, showing that the SoA
over a shared avatar is significantly dependent on both the
users’ level of control and freedom of movements inferred
by the type of task. Whether users possessed the same
prior knowledge of the action to perform also influences
the SoA. Interestingly, we observed that users tend to feel
some control over the avatar even when they actually have
little or no control over the virtual body, in cases where
their movements are more constrained. This suggests that
even with little or no control over a shared avatar, users
are capable of feeling some agency toward the virtual body.
Our results also reveal that the internal dimension of the
locus of control (LoC), which is a user personality trait, is
negatively correlated with the manner in which users feel
in control. Our combined results are promising for possible
applications in the fields of VR-based motion training or
collaborative teleoperation, where sharing the avatar control
with another user could emphasize the efficiency of previ-
ously developed systems [6], [12].
The main contributions of this paper are twofold: the
concept of “virtual co-embodiment” is introduced, and this
is the first study to provide a baseline for a more in-depth
analysis of virtual co-embodiment, and avatar control more
generally, on human behavior and self-perception.
2 RELATED WORK
According to Kilteni et al. [1], the SoE consists of SoA, SoBO,
and SoSL. As stated earlier, SoA refers to the feeling of
control (FoC) over actions and their consequences, whereas
SoBO refers to one’s self-attribution of body and SoSL refers
to one’s spatial experience of being inside a body. In VR, the
SoA can easily be elicited when the user motion is mapped
onto the virtual body in real-time or near real-time [1].
Such visuomotor congruence can also induce SoBO [13], as
long as the virtual body is structurally and morphologically
similar with ones biological body [1]. In contrast, SoSL
can be achieved by an immersion from 1PP as it is highly
determined from the egocentric visuospatial perspective.
While observing a virtual-realistic body from the 1PP
with congruent visuomotor cues is considered to be suffi-
cient for inducing the SoE in VR, several studies have also
demonstrated that incongruent visuomotor feedback can
affect the SoE. In particular, both SoA and SoBO have been
found to be reduced when a discrepancy exists between
vision and motor information [13], [14], [15]; however, they
can still be induced to some extent. For instance, Maselli and
Slater [16] showed that visual realism of the avatar favors
the SoE, despite the presence of incongruent visuomotor
and visuotactile cues. More recently, Kokkinara et al. [17]
showed that both SoBO and SoA can be induced over a
virtual-body walking from a 1PP, even though participants
are actually seated and only allowed head movements.
Such findings suggest that participants can feel SoA and
SoBO in some situations despite visuomotor discrepancies.
However, how the sharing of the control of a virtual body
with another user influences the SoE is unknown. Therefore,
we focus on sharing the control of a virtual body in this
study, and the following sections will cover related work on
the SoA and shared body experiences.
2.1 SoA
2.1.1 Theory
As stated earlier, the SoA is considered as one of the com-
ponents of the SoE in the VR field. However, in the fields
of philosophy and psychology, the SoA is considered to
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form a fundamental aspect of self-awareness together with
SoBO [18]. Therefore, numerous studies on SoA have been
conducted in the fields of philosophy and psychology to
examine human consciousness. Although the mechanisms
of human consciousness are still not fully understood,
two influential theoretical views have been put forward:
a comparator model [19] and retrospective inference view [20].
The comparator model suggests that the comparison between
predicted and actual consequences of an action through
sensorimotor processes determines the SoA [19], [21]. Thus,
the mismatch caused by spatial and temporal distortion of
movements or outcomes can attenuate the SoA [22]. Indeed,
numerous studies have shown evidence that discrepancies
between the actual movement and the corresponding visual
feedback [14], [15] or sensory outcome [21], [23] of the action
negatively affect the SoA. In comparison, retrospective infer-
ence view emphasizes external situational cues [20]. Accord-
ing to Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation [20],
the SoA arises if (1) an intention precedes an observed
action (priority), (2) the intention is compatible with this
action (consistency), and (3) the intention is the most likely
cause of this action (exclusivity). Therefore, priming is often
used to modulate the SoA by manipulating prior conscious
thought about an outcome [24], [25], [26]. However, the SoA
is increasingly recognized as being based on a combination
of internal motor signals and external evidence about the
source of actions and effects [11], [24], [27]. Thus, although
spatial and temporal contiguity between one’s own and
observed movements are the main cues for SoA [14], [15],
[22], higher-level cognitive processes, such as background
beliefs and contextual knowledge relating to the action, also
influence the induction of SoA [28], [29].
2.1.2 Measures
The measurements of SoA are generally categorized as
implicit and explicit measures [28]. Implicit measures, such
as sensory attenuation [21], intentional binding [30], [31],
and neurophysiological markers [32] assess a correlation
of voluntary actions about the agentic experience [28]. Al-
ternatively, explicit measures are based on the subjective
judgments of the FoC, the authorship or attribution of the
actions or their corresponding outcomes [11], [23], [25], [26],
[33]. Most studies have used explicit measures, especially
in VR [34], [35], [36]. These measures are typically assessed
in paradigms using button presses which produce sensory
feedback [23] or simple movements [14], [15], [20], [33],
[34], [37], [38]. For simple movements, a moving cursor
associated with a joystick [14], [15] or mouse [20], [37] and a
visual feedback of hand movements through a mirror [38],
a TV-screen [33], or VR [34] are often used.
Besides these experimental measurements, some person-
ality traits have been shown to be related to SoA. Neuro-
logical studies have shown that patients with schizophre-
nia tend to feel abnormal SoA, i.e., they have less ability
to distinguish sensations due to self-caused actions from
those due to external sources [15], [18], [39]. Indeed, schizo-
typy personality traits, an indicator of a predisposition to
schizophrenia, have been shown to be correlated with an
abnormal SoA [40]. In addition, some studies have revealed
that SoA is correlated with one’s personality of LoC, which
has been often used in the fields of education, health, and
clinical psychology. LoC refers to the degree to which people
believe that they have control over the outcome of events
in their lives, as opposed to external forces beyond their
control [41]. The Internal-Personal-Chance (IPC) test [42]
is one of the measurements for LoC, indicating a person’s
relative standing on each of the three dimensions of internal,
powerful others, and chance. Among them, the individuals
with a strong internal LoC believe events in their life are de-
rived primarily from their own actions. In a study including
manipulations of the SoA in VR, based on the principles
of priority, exclusivity, and consistency, Jeunet et al. [32]
suggested that the internal dimension of LoC is positively
correlated with participants’ level of agency.
2.1.3 Illusory SoA
As described earlier, spatial displacement or temporal delay
between action and outcome attenuates the SoA [14], [15],
[22]. However, we feel illusory SoA over distorted move-
ments as long as the displacement or delay is under the
threshold. For example, a recent study using VR showed
that spatial manipulations of 22 deg of angular offset from
1PP did not attenuate SoA [34]; this showed much lower
detection thresholds than previous studies without VR [14],
[15]. In addition, illusory SoA can occur over the actions
or outcomes made by someone else when there is a close
match between prior intentions and subsequent actions. In
a classic study by Nielsen [38], participants were instructed
to draw a straight line to the goal point. After some repe-
titions, the experimenter secretly inserted a mirror so that
the participants were looking at another person’s hand in
a mirror. They experienced the illusory SoA and attributed
the hand to their own. In Wegner and Wheatley’s “I-spy”
experiment [20], participants and an experimenter jointly
controlled a cursor. Auditory priming of action-relevant
thoughts induced illusory SoA even through the cursor was
being controlled by someone else. This suggests that post-
hoc judgments of SoA can easily be distorted in a joint action
when the action source is ambiguous. Yokosaka et al. [43]
reported that when participants watched their own and
another person’s hand motion alternately from 1PP, they felt
illusory SoA over the movement, although they were aware
that they were not performing a united motion.
Moreover, illusory SoA is possible over body movements
even when no actual corresponding action is being per-
formed. In the “helping hands“ experiment by Wegner et
al. [11], participants watched themselves in a mirror while
an experimenter standing directly behind them extended
and moved his or her arms as if the participants themselves
moved their arms. They reported that participants felt an
illusory SoA for another person’s hands when they were
primed about instructions for that person’s movements
in advance, although they factually did not move. VR is
also used to induce illusory SoA when passively observing
movements of a walking avatar from 1PP [17]. To sum-
marize, in situations where individuals do not move, the
action priming and movement observation from 1PP are
considered to be important for illusory SoA. Therefore, we
believe that users might experience all the three aforemen-
tioned types of illusory SoA in a virtual co-embodiment
experience, as the feedback component originates partially
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Fig. 2. Physical setup: two users are physically sitting in front of each
other and are immersed in the same avatar from a 1PP.
from one’s own movements and partially from someone
else’s movements.
2.2 Shared Body Experiences
Some previous studies have developed shared body expe-
riences, e.g., two individuals sharing 1PP [44], [45], kines-
thetic experiences [46], or body representations [44], [47],
[47], [48], [49], [50]. In particular, Petkova et al. [44] in-
troduced the perceptual illusion of body swapping and
showed that 1PP of another person’s body, in combina-
tion with the receipt of correlated multisensory information
from the body, was sufficient for inducing body owner-
ship. Mutual paralleled first-person-view-sharing systems,
in which a person can observe others’ first-person video
perspectives as well as their own perspective in realtime, are
also used in entertainment, remote collaboration, and skill
transmission systems [7], [45], [51]. Other approaches have
also explored the sharing of other senses, e.g., BioSync [46]
which is an interpersonal kinesthetic communication system
allowing users to sense and combine muscle contraction
and joint rigidity bidirectionally through electromyogram
measurement and electrical muscle stimulation. Lastly, the
enfacement phenomenon is a self–other merging experience,
in which participants reported that morphed images of
themselves and their partner contained more self than other
only after synchronous multisensory stimulation on their
faces [47], [48], [49].
3 CO-EMBODIMENT PLATFORM
In this section, we discuss about the proposed virtual co-
embodiment platform, which was used to conduct an ex-
periment, as described in Section 4.
The platform was developed in Unity and allows two
users to share the same virtual environment and interact in
real time, while being embodied in the same avatar. Our
setup is based on two HTC Vive head-mounted displays
(HMDs) with two HTC Vive controllers to immerse partici-
pants in the VE. The application was run on Unity 2018.1.0f2
at a constant frame rate of 90 Hz, and both computers were
physically connected on the same network to minimize la-
tency. Users were embodied in an anthropomorphic virtual
avatar from a 1PP (see Figure 2). In the center of the tracking
zone, two chairs and a table were placed, enabling users
to sit in front of each other. The physical furniture had its
virtual counterpart in the VE providing both a reference
frame and passive haptic feedback. The VE in which users
were immersed comprised an empty room.
In terms of avatar appearance, we chose to use a realistic
model in our experiment as well as immerse users in a
1PP, as these criteria were reported by recent studies to be
important for enhancing the overall SoE [16]. As animation
and control quality are known to be strongly linked to
the SoA, we primarily focused on avatar animation. This
was especially challenging in our case owing to the shared
control of the avatar. Note that, the differentiation of avatar
animation and control inputs is necessary for its computa-
tion.
In the case of a single-user situation, the animation of
the avatar depends solely on the control inputs of this
user. However, in this study, the control inputs result from
the combination of the inputs of two users. We therefore
implemented a method that allowed the sharing of the
avatar control with another user. As a virtual view that does
not correspond to the user’s own head movement could
cause motion sickness, each user observed his/her own
perspective in accordance with his/her head movement;
the head position and orientation of the HMDs were not
shared. Regarding the controller, we computed the weighted
average of the real-time position and orientation of each
user’s controller, and applied it to the shared avatar’s
controller. The weight defining the level of control could
be continuously changed from 0% to 100%. The weighted
average position and orientation were then computed by
interpolating between user controller positions and orienta-
tions.
Further, we chose to focus on the animation of the
arms and torso because, as stated in [32], the arms and
hands are the main body medium for interactions in VEs.
In addition, in our setup, as users were seated on a chair,
only animation for the upper body was required, which
was animated through inverse kinematics using the Final IK
Unity package. The Final IK computed inverse kinematics
using position and rotation inputs of the head and con-
trollers of the shared avatar, obtained through the previous
shared control computation. Users could thus observe the
same shared avatar, the movements of which, computed by
inverse kinematics, would follow more or less their own
hand according to their level of control at a certain time.
4 EXPERIMENT
4.1 Experiment Summary
We conducted an experiment, in which we explored the
influence of the degree of control of an avatar shared with
another person on one’s own SoA. More precisely, we
address the two following questions. Does the degree of
shared control have an impact on one’s FoC toward the
avatar? Does the predictability of the avatar movement have
an impact on one’s FoC toward the avatar?
In literature, the SoA was shown to largely depend on
the degree of discrepancy between the predicted sensory
feedback of an action and the actual outcome [23]. In
addition, participants were observed to feel illusory SoA
over distorted movements when the discrepancy is under
a certain threshold [34]. Moreover, other studies focused
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Fig. 3. Exposure phase in which participants were asked to light candles
(left); main experiment in which participants were asked to touch some
spheres with the tip of their controller (right). Images are shown from
third-person perspective for illustrative reasons.
on situations in which participants did not move and ex-
perienced illusory SoA toward movements they did not
perform, when they had prior knowledge of the action
and were immersed in a 1PP [11]. Based on these findings,
we hypothesized that the level of control over the avatar
shared between the two participants would influence the
SoA. We also hypothesized that the freedom of movement
in the task and whether both participants had the same prior
knowledge of the action would also influence the SoA.
To test these hypotheses, we designed an experiment in
which two participants were immersed simultaneously in a
VE and were embodied in the same avatar. More precisely,
the experiment was divided into three successive phases:
the first exposure phase, followed by the main experiment
phase, and finally the last exposure phase.
• First exposure phase: The first exposure phase was con-
ducted to allow the users to be accustomed to the
shared body control and experimental environment
(see Figure 3). Moreover, we took advantage of this
phase to evaluate users’ SoA and SoBO to assess their
level of embodiment when possessing full (indepen-
dent body) or half control (shared body) over the virtual
avatar.
• Main experiment: To explore the influence of the level
of shared control toward the avatar on the SoA, five
controlling weights were considered between 0% and
100%. In addition, to evaluate the influence of the free-
dom of movement and the intention toward an action
on the SoA, three tasks were considered (Figure 4).
• Last exposure phase: This phase was conducted to eval-
uate potential training effects of the main experiment
over agency and ownership ratings.
4.2 Participants
Twenty-four male participants from the university campus
participated in the experiment [age: M = 26±5 (SD)];
they were recruited from among both students and staff.
They were all unaware with respect to the purpose of the
experiment, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and
gave written and informed consent. The study conformed
to the declaration of Helsinki. The participants were paired
with those they had never interacted with earlier. Among
the participants, seven had no previous experience with VR,
fourteen had limited previous experience, and three were
Fig. 4. The three tasks that the users were asked to perform. Free task:
participants had to choose which sphere to touch (left). Target task:
the sphere that the participants were to touch was highlighted (center).
Trajectory task: the sphere to touch was highlighted and participants had
to follow a path from the table to the sphere with the tip of their controller
(right).
familiar with VR. All participants were right-handed male
Caucasians, to match the visual appearance of the virtual
avatar as much as possible.
4.3 Experimental Protocol
The overall organization of the experiment is summarized
in Figure 5 and is further described as follows.
Upon their arrival, participants read and signed the
experiment consent form and filled in a demographic ques-
tionnaire. They also completed the IPC cognitive test [42].
The internal score computed from this test was used later
to measure LoC and explore its influence on the SoA.
Then, they were briefed about the experiment through an
explanatory video. They were explained that they would
share a body and control over it with the other participant.
After the explanation, they were instructed to sit on a chair
in front of a table facing each other and wear an HMD to
get immersed in the VE (Figure 2).
As previously explained, the experiment was divided
into three phases, which the participants experienced in
order: the first exposure phase, main experiment, and last
exposure phase. In addition, while participants were im-
mersed in the VE, they were instructed not to talk or interact
with each other. As the tasks to perform only required
motions of the right arm, we decided to focus on the right
arm and did not animate the left arm. Participants were
therefore asked to keep their left arm along their torso and
not move it. After the experiment, they were instructed to
remove their HMDs and provide general comments and
feedback through a web form. The overall process took
approximately 1 h.
4.3.1 First and last exposure phases
Participants started with the first exposure phase and fin-
ished with the last exposure phase, in which they were
asked to light candles using a virtual lighter (Figure 3,
left). Once participants had lit all their candles, the candles
would extinguish, and the participants were asked to light
them again. This task lasted for 2 min, and each phase was
repeated twice (2 blocks): once with half of the avatar control
for each participant, and once with full control over their
own avatar. Each block would finish with an ownership
and an agency questionnaire, which consisted of 11 items
(Table 1); the participants answered based on a scale ranging
from 1 to 7 by pressing buttons on the controller in their
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hand. Each participant thus answered the questionnaires
four times.
4.3.2 Main experiment
In the main experiment, the avatar was always shared and
the weight of avatar control for a participant varied between
0% and 100% (respectively 100% minus this weight for the
other participant). We considered five weights between 0%
and 100% to evaluate how differences in the degree of con-
trol would impact participants’ SoA. Thus, we hypothesized
that the SoA would be positively correlated with the degree
of control.
Participants were asked to perform three tasks involving
touching one virtual sphere among four spheres, with the
extremity of virtual controller hold in the right hand. Four
spheres were presented in front of the participants, all at
equivalent distances from their right hand. More precisely,
by using the original 3D model of the HTC Vive controller,
we attached a short rod with a small sphere on top; this tip
collided with the sphere (Figure 3, right).
There were three types of tasks: free, target, and trajec-
tory. The different tasks contrasted from each other with
respect to the freedom of movement they allowed and
whether both participants possessed the same prior knowl-
edge of the same action to perform. More precisely, in the
free task, each participant was free to choose which sphere
to touch (Figure 4, left). In the target task, the sphere to
touch was highlighted with a colored halo (see Figure 4,
center). Similarly, in the trajectory task, the sphere to touch
was highlighted and the participants were asked to follow
a path from the table to the highlighted sphere by using the
tip of the controller; this task required more precision (see
Figure 4, right).
These three tasks were selected in line with the hypothe-
sis that constraints in the movements and prior knowledge
of the action to perform (i.e., the intention toward the action)
both impact the SoA. In the free task, each participant
was free to choose which sphere to touch (Figure 4, left),
under a condition where the movement of participants was
not restricted and where the movement intention was not
assuredly shared as participants might not decide to touch
the same sphere. In the target task, the sphere to touch was
highlighted with a colored halo (Figure 4, center), under
the condition that the movement was not restricted and
the movement intention was shared as both participants
focused on touching the same sphere. In the trajectory task,
the sphere to touch was highlighted and participants were
to follow a path from the table to the sphere by using
the tip of the controller. This task required more precision
(Figure 4, right), and included both movement restriction
and the shared intention, as participants had to follow a
specific path to touch the same sphere.
These choices were driven by the demonstration of pre-
vious studies that SoA increases when participants have
more action choices [52]. However, in our case, owing to
changes in the level of control over the avatar, the more the
participants had the choice of the action (in the free task
compared to the target and trajectory tasks), the more the
visuomotor discrepancies were expected between partici-
pants and avatar movements. We thus supposed that the
SoA would be higher for the target and trajectory tasks with
Fig. 5. Diagram of experimental flow.
smaller visuomotor discrepancies. Considering the results
of Wegner et al. [11], we also expected that SoA would be
higher in tasks where the intention of movement was shared
(in target and trajectory tasks compared to free task).
In each task, participants performed 45 trials. For each
trial, the participants started observing their own avatar
over which they had full control. To ensure that both partici-
pants had the same initial position, they were asked to place
their right hand holding the controller on the table on a
specific virtual reference and remain on the initial reference.
After 2 s, the four spheres were displayed in red with a
message “don’t move yet”. The message disappeared after
2 s, the spheres turned blue, and then the participants could
perform the task. When a sphere (any of the four spheres for
the free task, specified sphere in other tasks) was touched
for 1 s by the tip of the controller of the shared avatar, the
task was over and the following question was asked to both
participants: “On a scale ranging from 1 to 7, how much did
you feel in control during this trial?”. As such, we followed
the same protocol as that used by Jeunet et al. [32] to assess
the SoA through a question that is easily understandable by
participants and proved to relate to the judgment of agency.
Participants provided a rating between 1 and 7 to validate
their choice using the controller. When both participants had
answered the question, they were asked to place their hand
on the highlighted spot to start the next trial.
4.4 Experimental Design
4.4.1 First and Last Exposure Phases
A within-subject design was set up for these experimental
phases, where we considered two independent variables:
control and stage. The main variable (control) considered
whether the participants were sharing the avatar, and pos-
sessed two levels: 1) participants sharing the avatar with
50% control each (Half ) or 2) participants having full control
over their own avatars (Full). The stage variable determined
whether the task was completed in the first or last part of
the experiment, and thus had two levels: First and Last. This
part of the experiment was divided into two blocks corre-
sponding to the two levels of the control condition. In both
first and last exposure phases, whether participants would
start with one block or the other was fully counterbalanced
in the experiment.
The measured data (dependent variables) in a question-
naire were inspired from previous work [10], [53], [54],
where questions were divided in two groups: agency and
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. X, XXX XXXX 7
TABLE 1
Questionnaire used in the first and last exposure phases. Questions in
italics are control questions regarding agency and ownership.
Variable Question
Agency 1) The virtual arm moved just like I wantedto, as if it was obeying my will.
2) I felt as if I was controlling the movement
of the virtual arm.
3) I felt as if the virtual arm was controlling my
will.
4) I felt as if the virtual arm was controlling my
movements.
5) I felt as if the virtual arm had a will of its own.
6) I felt as if I was causing the movement I
saw.
Ownership 1) I felt as if I was looking at my own arm.
2) I felt as if the virtual arm was part of my
body.
3) I felt as if the virtual arm was my arm.
4) I felt as if I had no longer a right arm, as if my
right arm had disappeared.
5) I felt as if the virtual arm was from someone
else’s body.
ownership (Table 1). For each question, participants were
asked to provide rating based on a 7-point Likert scale.
Based on previous works showing that asynchronous vi-
sual information in relation to participants’ own movements
affects both SoBO [35], [55], [56] and SoA [14], [15], our main
hypothesis was that participants would have lower agency
and ownership when they had only half control than when
they had full control of their avatar.
4.4.2 Main Experiment
We also adopted a within-subject design for the main part
of the experiment, considering two independent variables:
weight and task. The weight variable determined the degree
of control the participants had over the avatar and had
five levels (W0, W25, W50, W75, and W100). For each pair,
weight was inverted between participants, i.e., the sum of
the controlling weights of the two participants was always
100%. Task corresponded to the three tasks included in the
experiment (Free, Target, and Trajectory; see Section 4.3.2 for
details). The main experiment was divided into three blocks.
To minimize the ordering effect, the orders of the blocks and
tasks were counterbalanced following a Latin square design.
Each iteration of Task in one block comprised one training
trial (with half control of the avatar) and three repetitions
of the five trials (for the five levels of Weight). The order of
Weight levels within the three repetitions was fully coun-
terbalanced. Without considering the training trials, each
participant performed 135 trials. Each trial lasted around
3 s.
The measured data (dependent variables) considered
the performance and behavioral measurements. Regarding
performance, we measured task-completion time, i.e., the
time required to select the sphere after it turned blue
(in seconds). Regarding behavioral measures, the motions
(position and orientation per frame) of the participants’
and shared avatar’s controllers were recorded during the
trials. Finally, the subjective FoC ratings for the question,
“How much did you feel in control?” asked after each
Fig. 6. Left: Point plot of the mean subjective ratings of Feeling of
Control (FoC) considering Weight of control and Task during main ex-
periment. Right: Scatter plots with linear regression lines of FoC ratings
on Weight for each task (Free: R2=0.83, Target : R2=0.66, Trajectory :
R2=0.74). Error bars (left) and translucent bands (right) indicate 95%
CIs. A total of 10,000 bootstrap samples were used to estimate each
95% CI.
trial were rated on a 7-point Likert scale. Participants also
reported general comments and feedback at the end of the
experiment.
In summary, considering our experimental design, our
main hypotheses are as follows.
H1 When the degree of control (Weight) decreases, the FoC
ratings decrease.
H2 The FoC ratings will be higher for the tasks in which
movements are more constrained (Trajectory > Tar-
get > Free).
H3 Participants with a higher Internal score of LoC experi-
ence higher FoC.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Main Experiment
Eleven trials out of all 3240 trials were excluded from the
analysis after a visual inspection of the raw data revealed
that either the task completion time, participant motion, or
motion of the avatar exhibited abnormal values (values out-
side the range of three standard deviations from the mean).
ANOVA analyses were conducted when the normality as-
sumption (Shapiro–Wilk’s normality test) was not violated
(p > .05). In particular, two-way ANOVA analyses with
repeated measures were conducted, considering the within-
group factors of Weight (5 levels: W0, W25, W50, W75,
and W100) and Task (3 levels: Free, Target, and Trajectory).
When the sphericity assumption was violated (Mauchlys
sphericity test), the degrees of freedom were corrected using
the Greenhouse–Geisser correction. In addition, η2p was pro-
vided for the quantitative comparison of effect sizes. Finally,
Tukey’s post-hoc tests (α = .05) were conducted to check
the significance for pairwise comparisons of the parametric
data.
When the normality assumption was violated (Shapiro–
Wilk’s normality test, p < 0.05), Friedman test was con-
ducted for each task independently followed by a post-hoc
Wilcoxon-signed ranks test. For multiple post-hoc compar-
isons, Holm correction was applied for the non-parametric
data. As for the correlation analyses, Pearson’s r (r) was
used for parametric data and Spearman’s r (rs) was used
for non-parametric data.
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Fig. 7. Box plots of the task completion time considering the different
Weight groups for each task.
5.1.1 Feeling of Control (FoC)
The two-way ANOVA analysis revealed a significant main
effect of Task [F (1.84, 42.37)=17.07, p< .001, η2p=0.43]
and of Weight [F (2.4, 55.15)=256.86, p< .001, η2p=0.92].
However, the two-way ANOVA also exhibited a sig-
nificant interaction effect between Task and Weight
[F (5.22, 120.01)=6.30, p< .001, η2p=0.22]. First, Tukey’s
post-hoc tests indicated that, for all tasks, the FoC signifi-
cantly decreased as the degree of control (Weight) decreased
(p < .001 for all), which is further supported by the primary
effects on Weight. Thus, this result supports [H1]. Next,
when comparing the FoCs for each Weight level (see Figure
6 left), Tukey’s post-hoc tests demonstrated that, for the
W0 Weight, the FoC was significantly higher for the Target
task than for the other tasks (both p < .05). In contrast,
for the W25, W50, W75 levels of Weight, the FoC was
significantly lower for the Free task than for the other tasks
(all p < .05). Finally, for the W100 Weight, the post-hoc
tests did not exhibit any significant difference. Thus, these
results only support [H2] partially, as although the Free task
(the less constrained task) consistently obtained the lowest
FoC ratings (except for the W100), this effect was not visible
between Target and Trajectory tasks.
As the ANOVA analysis indicated that the strongest
effects originated from the Weight factor, to further charac-
terize the relationship between FoC and the Weight factor, a
linear regression analysis was conducted across participants
for each task (Figure 6 right). The regression equations were
Free: y = 0.0487x+ 1.77(R2 = 0.83)
Target: y = 0.0379x+ 2.94(R2 = 0.65)
Trajectory: y = 0.0444x+ 2.49(R2 = 0.73).
The regression equations exhibited linear positive cor-
relations between the FoC and the Weight. To determine
whether the computed slopes differed significantly from
0, we computed the slope of each participants linear re-
gression and conducted a t-test (H0: Slope is equal to 0):
(Free: t(23)=35.665, p < .001, Target: t(23)=13.219, p < .001,
Trajectory: t(23)=16.622, p < .001). The results of the t-test
indicated that the mean slopes all significantly differed from
0. These results further support [H1]. Section 5.2 further
analyzes the FoC ratings in correlation with the IPC scores.
Fig. 8. Box plots of the mean offsets between the positions of the avatar’s
hand and the participant’s actual hand considering the Weight for each
Task.
Fig. 9. Scatter plots with linear regression lines of FoC ratings on mean
offsets between the positions of the avatar’s hand and the participant’s
actual hand for each Task. Translucent bands indicate 95% CIs.
5.1.2 Task Completion Time
Because the task completion time was dependent on the
weights of the two participants (their sum adding to 100%),
for the task completion time analysis, the Weight group
factor had only three levels: W0-W100, W25-W75, and W50-
W50 (see Figure 7). In addition, owing to the different
natures of each task (aimed movement, path following task),
we did not assess the differences among Tasks for the task
completion time. Therefore, we conducted three Friedman
tests considering Weight group as a factor, one for each task.
The Friedman tests exhibited significant differences among
the task completion times of the Weight groups only for the
Free task (χ2=14, p < .001), and no significant differences
were found for the Target task (χ2=0.17, p = .92) or the Tra-
jectory task: (χ2=3.5, p = .17). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons
indicated that for the Free task, the task completion time was
significantly smaller in the W0-W100 condition (W0-W100 <
W25-W75: Z=-2.81, p<.01, W0-W100 < W50-W50: Z=-3.30,
p<.01). No significant differences were found between W25-
W75 and W50-W50 (Z=-1.68, p = .092).
5.1.3 Motion Data
The offsets (Euclidean distance) between the positions of
the participants and avatars hands were calculated for each
frame and then averaged for each trial (see Figure 8). This
value provided a rough estimate of the overall visuo-motor
discrepancies for each trial. We excluded the W100 condition
from the analysis as the discrepancy was 0 regardless of
the Task (condition with full control). The residuals did
not follow a normal distribution; thus, Friedman tests were
considered. In addition, the analysis considered each Task
independently. Friedman tests exhibited significant differ-
ences of the mean offsets among Weights for all Tasks:
(Free: χ2=56.75, p < .001, Target: χ2=67.25, p < .001, Tra-
jectory: χ2=61.85, p < .001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons
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indicated that the mean offsets were significantly smaller
when the Weight was larger for all comparisons in all Tasks
(p<.001 all) except for the comparison between offsets in the
W0 and W25 conditions for the Free task.
An additional correlation analysis was performed to
assess the link between the mean offset across all weights
and the perceived FoC. The correlation analysis revealed
that the offsets were negatively correlated with FoC for
all Tasks: Free: rs=-0.84, p<.001, Target: rs=-0.84, p<.001,
Trajectory: rs=-0.83, p<.001) (See Figure 9).
Moreover, to check if the mean offsets would vary
between tasks, another analysis was performed for each
weight. Friedman tests revealed significant differences
among the mean offsets of Tasks for W0 (χ2=28.58, p< .001),
W25 (χ2=32.33, p < .001), W50 (χ2=37.33, p < .001), and
W75 (χ2=32.33, p < .001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons
showed that for W0, W25, W50, and W75 the mean offsets
were significantly higher for Free compared to Target and
Trajectory (both p<.001).
Finally, to gain some insight regarding the global behav-
ior of users during each trial, speed profiles were computed
for each participant per Weight and Task for each trial.
Speed profiles were normalized in time by resampling the
values at 100 intervals between the start (time 0%) and
end of the trial (time 100%). We then computed the mean
and standard deviation of the speed profiles between all
participants as reported in Figure 10. To compare the speed
profiles for each Task and for each interval, we conducted a
Friedman test considering Weight as a factor. Tasks were not
compared among each other as the nature of each Task was
different. Among those intervals, post-hoc pairwise compar-
isons (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests) were performed to find
pairwise differences among different Weights. The results of
pairwise comparisons are also summarized in Figure 10, in
which each Weight is denoted by a color; lighter colors are
associated with lower Weights and vice-versa, and colored
segments are placed at the intervals in which significant
differences were found. Thus, the presence of a colored
segment indicates that a significant difference (p < .05) was
found between the current interval and the corresponding
interval of the color-coded condition.This result allows us to
highlight the tasks in which changes in the control induced
differences in participant behavior. For example, for Target
and Trajectory tasks, the Weight seems to only have a visible
impact at the end of the motion, in particular for W0 and
W25, whereas more discrepancies were found for the Free
task.
5.2 Personality Traits
According to the responses of the IPC test, each participant
obtained three scores (from 0 to 48), one for each dimension
of the IPC test (i.e. Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance).
Each score was calculated by adding the responses of the
eight items for each dimension and a constant of 24. Sim-
ilar to previous studies, only the Internal dimension was
assessed [32], as it was found to be the dimension that
was more related to the FoC. A high rating on the Internal
score indicates that the subject has a strong internal Locus
of Control (i.e., they believe that events in their life derive
primarily from their own actions).
Fig. 10. Averaged Speed profiles between all participants for each
Weight and Task, normalized in time and re-sampled at 100 intervals.
Colored segments were placed at intervals in which significant differ-
ences (Friedman and Wilcoxon pairwise comparison tests) were found.
Colors are associated to a specific Weight, from the lightest (lower
Weight) to the darkest (higher Weight).
Fig. 11. Scatter plots with linear regression lines between the internal
score of the IPC test and the regression coefficient terms obtained
between the FoC ratings and Weight for each participant (slope (top) and
intercept (down)). Translucent bands indicate 95% CIs. 10,000 bootstrap
samples were used to estimate each 95% CI.
First, to verify whether participants with higher internal
score of IPC tended to experience higher FoC when they
had full control (W100), we conducted a correlation analysis
between the internal scores and the mean FoC scores in the
W100 condition for each task. As a result, no significant cor-
relation was found between the internal score and the FoC:
Free (rs=0.23, p = .29), Target (rs=0.33, p = .11), Trajectory
(rs=0.25, p = .23). This result might be explained by a ceiling
effect of very high values of FoC in the W100 condition. This
result does not support [H3].
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Fig. 12. Box plots of mean ratings of agency (Left) and ownership
(Center) obtained in the questionnaires in First and Last exposure
phases. Right: Scatter plots with linear regression lines of agency rat-
ings on ownership ratings. Translucent bands indicate 95% CIs. 10,000
bootstrap samples were used to estimate each 95% CI.
In contrast to previous studies, the modulation of the
participant’s control was quantified by the Weight parame-
ter. This enables us to analyze the correlation of the internal
component of the IPC with the FoC in a wider range of
FoC values. First, as already detailed in Subsection 5.1.1,
we computed the correlation between the Weight and the
FoC for each participant. The intercept coefficient could be
considered as the FoC “baseline,” while the slope could be
related to the “sensitivity” to changes in the participant’s
control. In other words, the slope provides information on
how much the change in the participant’s control influences
the FoC, and the intercept provides a lower bound for
the FoC. In practice, in our scenario, both parameters are
strongly correlated because there is a strong ceiling effect
for the FoC at W100. Thus, we computed the regression
equations of FoC on Weight for each participant and per-
formed correlation analyses of both the slopes and intercepts
with the participants score of the Internal dimension of
the Locus of Control (from the IPC test). The results show
a positive correlation between the slope and the Internal
dimension for each Task (Free: r=0.54, p<.01, Target: r=0.47,
p<.05, Trajectory: r=0.49, p<.05, see Figure 11 up), as well
as the negative correlation between the intercept and the
Internal dimension for Target and Trajectory tasks (Target:
r=-0.44, p<.05, Trajectory: r=-0.47 p<.05), and a marginally
significant effect for the Free task (r=-0.40, p=.05) (See Figure
11 down).
These results seem to suggest that participants with a
higher Internal score were more sensitive to changes in the
avatar control as they had lower intercept values and higher
slope values.
5.3 First and Last Exposure Phases
The agency and ownership ratings for the First and Last
exposure phases were aggregated and averaged (control
item answers were inverted) to compute one agency and
one body ownership score per participant. Owing to the
non-parametric nature of the data and the need of test-
ing interaction effects, we applied an aligned rank trans-
form (ART) on the data. This procedure enables the use
of ANOVA to analyze the interaction effects with non-
parametric data [57]. Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs
with the within-subjects factors Control (2 levels: Half and
Full) and Stage (2 levels: First and Last) were performed for
both agency and ownership scores. Regarding the agency
scores, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
Weight [F (1, 23)=198.41, p< .001, η2p=0.90] and Stage
[F (1, 23)=19.22, p< .001, η2p=0.46] (Figure 12 Left). In
addition, the Weight × Stage interaction effect was sig-
nificant [F (1, 23)=5.17, p< .05, η2p=0.18]. Thus, we only
report the post-hoc tests for the interaction effect. First, post-
hoc pairwise comparisons using the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test (Holm corrected) showed that in both First and Last
phases the agency scores were significantly higher in the
Full condition than in the Half condition (First: Z=-5.29,
p<.001, Last: Z=-5.29, p<.001). Second, in both Full and Half
conditions, the agency scores were higher in the Last than
First phases (Full: Z=-2.58, p¡.05, Half: Z=-2.09, p¡.05).
Regarding the ownership scores, the ANOVA showed
a main effect of Weight [F (1, 23)=84.96, p< .001,
η2p=0.79] and a marginally significant main effect of Stage
[F (1, 23)=3.78, p= .06, η2p=0.14] (See Figure 12 Center).
The Weight × Stage interaction effect was not significant
[F (1, 23)=0.68, p= .42, η2p=0.03]. Similar to the agency
ratings, the ownership scores were significantly higher for
the Full condition. In addition, we conducted a correlation
analysis between the agency and the ownership scores
for each participant, showing that ownership was posi-
tively correlated with agency in the Half condition (rs=0.54,
p<.01), but not in the Full condition (rs=0.31, p = 0.14) (See
Figure 12 Right).
6 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss how the results can be interpreted
in terms of SoA, which is measured by subjective judgments
of FoC over the participants’ actions. We also provide ad-
ditional insights regarding the Locus of Control and the
relation between SoA and SoBO.
6.1 Main Results
The SoA results show that changes in the degree of control
clearly influenced the SoA, which validated [H1]. More
precisely, the FoC ratings, which were treated as an explicit
measure of the SoA according to previous studies [11], [26],
increased linearly with the increase in the degree of control
for all three tasks. This result can be explained by the fact
that the higher the degree of control is, the closer the visual
feedback of the avatar hand is to the actual hand position of
the participant, thereby reducing visual mismatch between
the movements of the avatar and the participants’ actual
movements. As stated by Farrer et al. [58], our ability to
recognize SoA from the visual cues of movement tend to
decrease in case of mismatch between visual feedback and
actual movement, i.e., when there are visuo-proprioceptive
discrepancies, which could justify the correlation observed
between the SoA and the degree of control. The participants’
feedback is also in line with this interpretation, as they
expressed their disturbance when their arm was controlled
out of their will: “It was confusing when the hand was going in
the direction I intended it to go but the speed did not totally match
my movements”. These results can also be explained by the
phenomenon of “body semantic violation” introduced by
Padrao et al. [59]. In our case, it refers to the fact that the
agency illusion will break when the discrepancy between
feedback and intended motion become too important.
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Another interesting result reveals that when participants
had no control over the avatar (W0), the SoA was higher for
the Target task than for the Free and Trajectory tasks. While
we hypothesized that the nature of the task could influence
the perceived SoA, the tasks differed in two main aspects.
The first difference relates to whether participants shared
an intention toward the action to perform. In the Target and
Trajectory tasks, the sphere to be touched was indicated,
meaning that both participants shared the same intention
of action: touching the same sphere. On the contrary, in
the Free task, participants could have different spheres
to touch in mind; this sometimes resulted in a difference
between the intention, the sphere a participant wanted to
touch, and the resulting action, the sphere finally touched
by the shared avatar. According to Wegner et al. [20],
SoA arises if (1) an intention precedes an observed action
(priority), (2) the intention is compatible with this action
(consistency), and (3) the intention is the most likely cause
of this action (exclusivity). In the Target and Trajectory tasks,
the three principles of priority, consistency, and exclusivity
are more likely to be respected as participants share the
same intention. Independently of their degree of control,
the controller of the shared avatar will therefore reach the
targeted sphere. This would support why SoA ratings where
higher in the Target and Trajectory tasks when participants
had no control over the shared avatar. The second difference
was in the visual difference between participants and avatar
hand positions (See Figure 8) depending on the task. Indeed,
results showed for example that visuo-motor and visuo-
proprioceptive discrepancies were lower in the Target task
compared to Free when participants had no control. This
can be because in the Target task, participants have the
indication of which sphere to touch, resulting globally in
the same movement toward the target sphere. Following
the statements of Farrer et al. [14] that visuo-motor discrep-
ancies tend to decrease the SoA, this could explain why
the SoA was higher in Target than in the Free task where
participants had no control at all. However, these results
only partially support [H2].
Furthermore, a surprising result is that in the Target and
Trajectory tasks, participants tended to overestimate their
SoA, feeling some SoA despite the absence of control. From
the analysis of speed profiles, we observed that major differ-
ences between control weights were found in the Free task,
whereas only some differences were observed in the Target
and Trajectory tasks, mostly at the end of trials. This seems
to show that participants tended to have similar reaching
behaviors regardless of their degree of control in the tasks
where the goal was shared. Other authors also observed that
the SoA was affected when the avatar’s and the participant’s
speed of movement differed [34], but not with spatial shift
of movement without speed alteration. These results could
explain why participants tended to overestimate their SoA
in the Target and Trajectory tasks, as we can see that even
with no or very low control, participants still performed
the task in a similar manner, therefore minimizing spatio-
temporal discrepancies.
We also observed during the experiment that some
participants reported a pure illusion of the control: “Some-
times, when the task was accomplished in an excellent manner,
I wondered if it was actually me who had moved the arm ”. It
is known how high-level contextual information (whether
participants believe that the outcome is either triggered
by themselves or by somebody else) can influence inten-
tional binding [29], referring to the implicit measure of the
conscious experience of SoA [31]. Depending on whether
participants were more or less aware of their degree of
control over the avatar may have affected their SoA. Fur-
thermore, another feedback particularly illustrates potential
future studies: “I had the impression that sometimes no one
controlled my movement and that I was actually watching a
video”. Indeed, sharing the control of the avatar with an
autonomous virtual agent instead of another person would
be an interesting topic to explore, in line with other studies
which explored the influence of human and computer co-
actors over the SoA in joint actions [60]. In particular, they
showed that SoA for self-generated actions was inhibited
when the participants knew that a computer was the co-
actor of the action, which would be interesting to explore in
the context of our co-embodiment setup.
6.2 SoA and Personality Traits
According to the results of the correlation analyses between
the slope or intercept of FoC and the internal dimension
of the locus of control (Figure 11), the intercept of the
regression of FoC scores on the weight factor was negatively
correlated with the Internal scores, especially when partic-
ipants had little or no control over the virtual body, which
does not validate H3. More precisely, participants with a
high Internal score tend to have their feeling of agency be
more impacted by changes in the level of control.
In previous studies, the Internal score was observed to
be positively correlated with participants SoA when partic-
ipants were immersed in a VE and embodied in their own
virtual avatar over which they had full control [32]. Our
results do not support those findings, probably due to the
ceiling effect we observed on SoA when participants had
full control. However, we herein investigated the influence
of the Locus of Control one-step further, exploring the
influence of the Internal score on the SoA when participants
did not have full control over their avatar. We found that
participants with a high Internal score tend to have their
SoA more impacted by changes in their degree of control
of the avatar. People with a high Internal score are known
to attribute the consequences to themselves rather than to
chance or other more powerful entities and tend to believe
that they have personal control over performance and re-
wards. However, such a definition does not commonly con-
sider body movements. Given the little amount of previous
work linking LoC and SoA, the results from such analyses
should thus be treated with considerable caution. On the
one hand, our results seem to suggest that people who tend
to attribute consequences to themselves are possibly more
aware of their own actions and thus notice more when they
do not have control. On the contrary, people with a high
Internal score might attribute events, movements included,
to themselves and then attribute the movements of the
avatar they did not cause to themselves. We would thus
expect from participants to experience a high SoA even with
no control over the shared avatar. While our results are in
contradiction with this hypothesis, it would be in agreement
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with Desantis et al.s study [29] wherein they showed that
when participants believe that they have control over the
environment, intentional binding, an implicit measure of the
SoA, is stronger. However, in our analysis, we only tried to
correlate the Internal score with FoC, an explicit measure
of the SoA. As previous findings do not always agree on
whether implicit and explicit measures of agency relate to
the same thing [61], it would be interesting to also consider
correlating implicit measures of the SoA with the Internal
score. Therefore, our results on the influence of the Internal
score of the Locus of Control over the SoA demonstrate the
need for further investigation on the topic.
6.3 Sense of Embodiment
Results from the agency and ownership questionnaires in
the first and last exposure phases showed that having only
half the control of an avatar significantly decreased both
SoBO and SoA compared to when they fully controlled
an avatar (Figure 12 Left and Center). Such results are in
line with numerous previous studies showing that asyn-
chronous visual information with reference to participants’
own movements eliminates both SoBO [35], [55], [56] and
SoA [14], [15]. In addition, our results showed that agency
and ownership scores were positively correlated when each
participant had half of the control of the avatar, whereas
no correlation was found when they had full control over
their own avatar (see Figure 12, right). As for the rela-
tionship between SoBO and SoA, some studies indicate
that both experiences can partially double dissociate [23],
[56], [62], [63] while some others suggest that they may
strengthen each other if they co-occur [10], [55], [64], [65]
(For review, see [66]). While we observed a ceiling effect of
the agency scores when participants had full control, the
positive correlation found in the half condition indicates
a close relationship between SoA and SoBO. Furthermore,
the variability of participants’ responses suggest that the
subjective experience of being embodied in a shared avatar
vary strongly among individuals.
Considering such positive correlations, the induction of
the stronger SoBO over the virtual body can be considered
to make SoA stronger and vice versa. Indeed, Kokkinara
et al. [34] observed that illusory SoA occurred despite the
distortion of movements being larger than the detection
thresholds of discrepancies found in previous studies. They
also remarked that their results might be due to the full-
body ownership illusion. In our study, Figure 9 indicates
that in the Free task, participants felt more than half con-
trol when the distance between participant’s and avatar’s
controller positions were below 0.1 m on average. As SoBO
is known to be affected by top–down factors such as the
congruence of the structural and morphological features be-
tween one’s own and virtual bodies [9], making the features
more congruent might therefore induce a stronger SoA. It is
also considered to increase the detection threshold of visuo-
motor discrepancies. In VR, some studies have exploited
such visuo-motor discrepancies to enhance passive haptics
or improve manipulations by changing the mapping of
movements from the physical to the virtual space [67], [68],
[69]. The interplay between SoBO and SoA is a subject of
psychological interests, but seeking to reduce the detection
threshold of visuo-motor discrepancies by strengthening
SoBO might also be useful to VR applications.
In addition, there has been some evidence showing the
dynamic relationship between self-attribution and sensori-
motor systems. In Nielsen’s study [38], participants experi-
enced the illusory SoA and attributed the experimenter’s
hand in a mirror to their own while drawing a straight
line. In particular, when the experimenter distorted their
movement so that he/she drew a curved line, participants
still attributed the movement to themselves and moved in
the opposition to the experimenter’s movement to com-
pensate for the error between the predicted and actual
movements. This means that as long as they attributed a
movement to themselves, they tried to control it. Asai [70]
also reported that illusory self-attribution of fake move-
ments might coordinate sensory input and motor output.
Conversely, when participants became aware of the uncon-
trollability of the cursor, the illusory self-attribution was
also dismissed. In our experiment, the degree of control
was different for each trial. Therefore, participants could not
fully adapt to it. However, in case of a constant degree of
control, participants might feel a stronger SoA since visuo-
motor adaptation might enable participants to predict the
avatar’s movements. Investigation of the adaptation process
of co-embodiment would therefore be necessary to further
understand how to elicit higher SoA for future applications.
6.4 SoA in Joint Action
We perform joint actions together with others in our daily
lives, e.g., carrying heavy things, and admirably coordinate
our plans and actions to achieve our joint goal. Indeed,
in such cases, individuals build up a shared motor plan,
incorporating others’ actions into their own motor system
during a joint action [60]. In joint actions, there is therefore
an automatic formation of a new agentic identity (a ’we’
identity) [60], and we feel the sense of us.
In the virtual co-embodiment situation where two indi-
viduals jointly control one avatar, as mutually coordinated
actions of self and other produce the united movements,
individuals might therefore also feel a sense of us. In our
experiment, we found it particularly surprising that partic-
ipants were able to immediately coordinate their actions
to the joint goal even with the completely novel way of
interacting and the lack of verbal communication.
Nevertheless, according to participants’ feedback, this
collaborative behavior was not shared between all partici-
pants and some of them even tended to get the feeling of
competing while performing the task: “I felt in competition
especially for the free task”, “I sometimes felt in competition when
we both had control and wanted to go on different spheres”. We
also observed that the time to complete the task was higher
when the control was equally shared between participants
compared to when one participant had more control than
the other in the Free task. Such differences could be caused
by the adoption of “leader/follower” behaviours when one
participant has more control that the other; however, further
investigation would be necessary to explore such a hy-
pothesis. Overall, research on virtual co-embodiment could
therefore contribute to studies of joint action that investigate
the mechanisms of how individuals coordinate their actions
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online, which is the essential capacity of humans as social
beings.
6.5 Future Work
Despite the interesting insights gained from our experi-
ment, we believe that there are still other aspects that would
require further research.
First, our study focused on a particular virtual co-
embodiment experience, namely two users sharing an
avatar to accomplish simple tasks with different degrees
of control. The results showed that users were able to
perform the tasks and their SoA positively correlated with
their degree of control. Additionally, previous knowledge of
actions to be performed significantly increased their SoA.
However, owing to the inter-relation of sharing the avatar
and the actual degree of control, clearly quantifying the
effects of each is difficult at this stage. Thus, the actual effect
of being embodied in the same virtual avatar with someone
else remains unclear. Does the mere fact of knowing that
you share your avatar with someone else have an impact on
the perception over the avatar? This is still an unanswered
question that would require additional experiments, e.g., a
virtual co-embodiment scenario in which a user shares the
avatar with an autonomous agent.
Second, the proposed control scheme demonstrated that
a partial degree of control can still elicit an SoA over a
shared virtual body and that the motor actions performed
in such a context resemble the ones performed with full
control of the virtual body. Our implementation was meant
to evaluate a novel concept, for which we tested one of
the potential shared-control schemes. For example, as the
shared control of the avatar head was particularly prob-
lematic, we decided that each user would keep full control
of the avatar head as sharing its control might require
unwanted changes at the user’s viewpoint. Such situations
could lead the user to be prone to motion sickness. However,
in situations where users are allowed to move freely around,
a more complex scheme would therefore be required as the
overall shared posture might be different than the users’
own posture. This would therefore require exploring more
complex control schemes, techniques for switching control
schemes depending on the situations and objectives, or
even supporting more people embodied in the same avatar.
Moreover, even at the level of controlling individual body
parts, different control schemes can be considered. In our
implementation, we averaged the positions and orientations
of the controllers, but other methods could, for instance,
explore splitting the control of different body parts or taking
control depending on a certain movement threshold.
Third, virtual co-embodiment has a variety of potential
applications such as remote training or entertainment. In a
manner similar to our method, Yang and Kim’s “Just Follow
Me” [6] method visualizes the motion of the trainer as a
ghost, superimposed on the avatar of the trainee in the
virtual environment. A similar method was also proposed
in augmented and mixed realities for remote guidance and
collaboration [71], [72]. In contrast, a system based on the
principle of virtual co-embodiment could allow trainers
to control a trainee’s movements to different degrees de-
pending on the training needs and allow them to interact
with each other through body movements while sharing
the same experience. The results of our study showed that
even when participants had no control over the avatar, they
overestimated their FoC when the situation constrained the
movements and indicated a shared goal. It suggests that
in the training situation, the trainee could feel SoA over
their body even when the body is fully controlled by the
trainer. In addition, training could be made more effective
by changing the degree of control depending on the learning
phase, which in turn would require designing efficient and
intuitive ways to adapt the degree of control to the situation.
Moreover, it would be interesting to compare the cognitive
load inferred by our system with the one felt in an approach
similar to the “Just Follow Me” method [6], searching if one
method is more susceptible to increase the cognitive load of
the trainee while learning through an application. This will
also open new opportunities to explore how mismatching
the actual and announced degrees of control influences the
user’s SoA, e.g., by telling both users that they have a 75%
control even though they actually have 50% control each.
Furthermore, another potential application of virtual co-
embodiment could be the tele-operation of one robot by
two experts at a time, as for instance the co-manipulation
of a medical robot by two surgeons. In such a scenario,
we may imagine experts taking alternatively more or less
control over the avatar in order to actuate the robot, giving
them the possibility of making “pauses” in the manipu-
lation, while maintaining a first-person point of view in
the avatar in order to keep following the procedure easily.
Such applications could also be extended and relevant for
tele-operations in asymmetric telepresence systems, as the
one developed by Steed et al. [73], where several users
might be immersed in the same environment with different
capabilities of interacting. Overall, considering new means
of making users efficiently collaborate in future applications,
e.g., through the use of verbal interactions, visual cues, and
interaction design, will be important.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the results of
this study were obtained only for male participants from
the university campus (students and staff). Given that re-
cent evidence suggests that interactions and collaboration
between persons can be influenced by gender diversity
(e.g., in teams [74], in pedestrian interactions [75]), gender
might have influenced the results of our study, particularly
in terms of whether the participants adopted collaborative
or competitive strategies. It would be valuable to replicate
our study with participants of more diverse gender and
attributes.
Lastly, as virtual co-embodiment is a merging experience
with someone else, it has the possibility to produce cognitive
effects on users. Indeed, shared bodily experiences such as
the enfacement illusion (i.e., self-other face-perception mod-
ification by synchronous multisensory stimulation) [47],
[48], [49] are known to produce both perceptual and social
binding. A stranger stimulated in synchrony was judged as
more similar, physically and in terms of personality, and
as closer to the self [47], [50]. In addition, enfacement was
positively correlated with the participant’s empathic traits
and with the physical attractiveness that the participants at-
tributed to their partners [49]. In this sense, co-embodiment
could be used as a tool for psychological investigations of
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the “self”.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the concept of “virtual co-
embodiment”, a situation that enables a user and another
entity (e.g., another user, robot, autonomous agent) to be
embodied in the same virtual avatar. In addition, we de-
scribed an experiment that examined the influence of the
degree of control of an avatar shared with another person on
ones own SoA, as well as the influence of the predictability
of avatar movements. Our results indicated that participants
succeeded frequently in estimating their actual level of
control over the shared avatar. Interestingly, they tended to
overestimate their feeling of control when the visual feed-
back of the avatar’s movements was closer to their actual
movements, as well as when they had prior knowledge of
the action to be performed. In addition, our results showed
that participants performed similar motions regardless of
their level of control. Finally, our results reveal that the
internal dimension of the locus of control is negatively
correlated with the participants’ perceived FoC.
Taken together, these findings not only corroborate and
extend previous studies, but they also pave the way for fur-
ther applications in the field of VR-based training and col-
laborative tele-operation applications in which users would
be able to share their virtual body.
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